Publications

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Published

Ebert, P. Essays on Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic. 2019. Edited with Marcus Rossberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ebert. P. and Rossberg, Marcus. “Creationism in Frege's Grundgesetze?”, Essays on Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Ebert and Rossberg (Eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2019, pp.325-342.

Ebert, P. and Rossberg, M. “Contemporary Reviews of Frege's Grundgesetze”. Essays on Frege’s Basic Laws of Arithmetic, Ebert and Rossberg (Eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2019, pp.637-652.

Ebert, P. Review of "Abstraction and Infinity" by Paolo Mancosu. NDPR, 2017. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/abstraction-and-infinity/">https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/abstraction-and-infinity/.

Haddock, A. “I am NN: A Reconstruction of Anscombe’s ‘The First Person’”, European Journal of Philosophy, published online April 2019.

Haddock, A. “Disjunctivism, Skepticism, and the First Person”, in C. Doyle, J. Milburn, and D. Pritchard (eds.) New Essays on Disjunctivism, London: Routledge, 2019.

Haddock, A. “Review of Thinking and Being by Irad Kimhi”, Mind, published online July 2019.

Haddock, A. “Anscombe and Self-Consciousness”, in Roger Teichmann (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Elizabeth Anscombe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Haddock, A. “Knowledge Aided by Observation”, in Alex Geddes and Alec Hinshelwood (eds.) Beings and Doings, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Ichikawa, Jonathan. “Faith and Epistemology”, Episteme, Online Early. Open access. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.30 .*

Ichikawa, Jonathan. “Rape Culture and Epistemology”, Co-authored (equal division) with Bianca Crewe, forthcoming in Jennifer Lackey (ed), Applied Epistemology, Oxford University Press.

Jenkins, C. and Ichikawa, J., “On Putting Knowledge ‘First’”, in J. A. Carter, E. Gordon, and B. Jarvis (eds.) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, Oxford University Press, 2017: 113-31. ISBN: 9780198716310

Jenkins, C. “The Truth Fairy and the Indirect Epistemic Consequentialist”, with Daniel Elstein, to appear in N.J.L.L. Pedersen and P. Graham (ed.s) Epistemic Entitlement, Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.

Jenkins, C. “Metaphysical Vagueness Without Vague Objects”, with Ali Abasnezhad, in Thought 7 (4), pp. 278-83. (2018): https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/tht3.398

Jenkins, C., “How Do We Know That 2+2=4?”, to appear in K. Kampourakis and K. McCain (ed.s) What Is Scientific Knowledge?, Routledge, forthcoming.*

Jenkins, C. “Review of Ian McEwan, Machines Like Me”, in The Philosophers’ Magazine issue 86, 2019.

Jenkins, C. “All Hearts In Love Use Their Own Tongues: Concepts, Verbal Disputes, and Disagreeing About Love”, in A. Martin (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Love In Philosophy, Routledge, 2018: 72-82. ISBN: 9781138184442.

Jenkins, C., ‘‘Addicted? To ‘Love’?’, in Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 2017: 24 (1), 93-6. DOI: 10.1353/ppp.2017.0012.

Mandrigin, A. “The where of bodily awareness”, Synthese, Forthcoming. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02171-3.

Melis, G. “How many normative notions of rationality? A Critical Study of Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality”, Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz088

Melis, G and Wright, C. “Oxonian Scepticism About the A Priori”, Forthcoming in Dodd D. and Zardini E. (eds.), Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori, Oxford University Press.*

Melis, G. “The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2018, 96 (2): 367-379.*

Merlo, G. “A defence of Lichtenberg”, Episteme, forthcoming. (DOI: https://doi.org/10. 1017/epi.2019.40).*

Merlo, G. “Appearance, reality and the meta-problem of consciousness", Journal of Consciousness Studies, Forthcoming.*

Merlo, G. “Review of Coates, P. & S. Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness (Oxford University Press)”, The Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming. (DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz011)

Merlo, G. “Disjunction and the logic of grounding”, Erkenntnis, Forthcoming.

Roca-Royes, S. “A priori knowledge, peer-agreement and peer-disagreement”, in Dodd, D. and Zardini, E. (eds), Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.*

Roca-Royes, S. “The Integration Challenge in Modality”, in Bueno, O. and Shalkowski, S. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Modality, forthcoming.

Roca-Royes, S. ”The Epistemology of Modality”, in Bliss, Ricki and Miller, James (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics, forthcoming.

Roca-Royes, Sonia, “Concepts and the Epistemology of Essence”, Dialectica, 73/1-2, 2019, 3-29. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1746-8361.12266.*

Roca-Royes, S. “Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing”, Synthese, special issue on The Legacy of David Lewis. (2018) https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1728-5

Roca-Royes, S. (2018). “Rethinking the epistemology of modality for abstracta”, in Fred, I. and Leech, J. (eds), Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale, Oxford: OUP.*

Roca-Royes, S. (2017). ‘‘Similarity and Possibility: An epistemology of de re possibility for concrete entities”, in Fischer, R and Leon, F. (Eds.), Modal epistemology after rationalism, Springer international publishing, Synthese Library: 221-245.*

Wei, Xintong. “On Pretense’s Role in the Process of Doxastic Self-Deception”, Philosophical Explorations, forthcoming.

Wei, Xintong. “The Permissible Norm of Truth and ‘Ought Implies Can’”, Logos and Episteme, forthcoming.

Wright, C. “Logical Non-Cognitivism”, Philosophical Issues, 28, Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, 2018 doi: 10.1111/phis.12132

Wright, C and Melis, G. “Williamsonian Scepticism about the A Priori”, for Dylan Dodd and Elia Zardini, eds, Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori, (OUP Forthcoming)

Under Review

Ichikawa, Jonathan. “Contextual Injustice”, under review with Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal.

Ichikawa, Jonathan. “On Defensiveness”, under review with Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

Merlo, G. “The metaphysical problem of other minds”, under review with the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. *

Wei, Xintong. “Self-deception: What is it?”, Philosophy Now.

Wright, C. “Is Neo-Logicism founded on a mistake about Logic? Wright, Hale and Heck on Higher-Order Logic”, submitted to Mind.

Wright, C, Conlan, P and Merlo, G. “Eyes Directed Outwards”, Critical Notice of Transparency And Self-Knowledge, Alex Byrne, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780198821618). Submitted to the Journal of Philosophy.


Drafts

Conlan, P. Single Premise Closure and Peer Disagreement.

Conlan P. and Lobus I. In Defence of the No Reference view of the First Person.

Lobus, I. Against Predicates. Draft.

Lobus, I. The Negation Argument. Draft.

Lobus, I. Notes on Justification. Draft.

Lobus, I. Is the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction Epistemologically Shallow? Draft.

Melis, G. The Indefeasibility of A Priori Propositional Warrants: a Critique.*

Melis, G. In Defence of Enkratic Principles.

Melis, G. Moderate and Strong Epistemic Akrasia Stand or Fall Together.