

## Stirling 'Knowledge Beyond Natural Science' Project – Self-knowledge seminar

### 08.03 / 15.03

#### Self-knowledge and rationality

What is the relationship between having knowledge of one's own mental states and being rational? Is self-knowledge (unlike, e.g., perceptual knowledge) a necessary condition for rationality? Supposing that it is, does this contribute to explain (some of) the other distinctive features of self-knowledge?

A. Byrne (2011), "Transparency, Belief, Intention", *Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 85* (1): 201-221.

M. Boyle (2011), "Transparent Self-Knowledge", *Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 85* (1): 223-241.

T. Burge (1996), "Our entitlement to self-knowledge" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 96 (1): 91-116

### 22.03 / 29.03

#### Self-knowledge and peculiar access

According to a widespread view, the way in which we gain knowledge of our own mental states is importantly different from the way in which we gain knowledge of the mental states of others. Is the widespread view correct? And if so, should we think of the difference in question in terms of a special method or way of knowing our own mind?

D. Armstrong, "Introspection" in his *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (Routledge, 1978).

E. Schwitzgebel (2012), "Introspection, what?" In Smithies, D. & D. Stoljar (eds.), *Introspection and Consciousness*, Oxford University Press: 29-48.

P. Carruthers (2010), "Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80 (1):76-111.

D. Bar-On & D. C. Long (2003), "Knowing selves: expression, truth and knowledge" in Gertler, B. (ed.), *Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge*, Ashgate: 179-212.

S. Shoemaker (1994), "Self-knowledge and 'inner sense'" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54: 249-314.

### 05.04 / 12.04

#### Self-knowledge and privileged access

Whether or not it is gained through a special method, there is a question as to whether self-knowledge is somehow 'easier' to attain than other kinds of knowledge. Are we better at forming beliefs about our own mental states than we are at forming beliefs about other aspects of reality? And if so, what is the exact nature and extent of the epistemic privilege we enjoy vis-à-vis our own minds?

W. Alston (1971), "Varieties of privileged access" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 8: 223-41

T. Williamson (1996), "Cognitive homelessness" *Journal of Philosophy* 93 (11): 554-573.

P. Snowdon (2012), "How to think about phenomenal self-knowledge" in Coliva, A. (ed.), *The Self and Self-knowledge*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 243-262  
C. Wright (2015), "Self-knowledge: the reality of privileged access" in: Goldberg, S. (ed.), *Externalism, Self-Knowledge and Scepticism: New Essays*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 49-74

### **19.04 / 26.04**

#### Self-knowledge and the self

When they speak of 'self-knowledge', philosophers don't have in mind just any kind of knowledge of one's own mental states. Rather, they have in mind a kind of knowledge of one's own mental states which is presented to its subject in a distinctive first-personal manner. What does the first-personal character of self-knowledge consist in? Is self-knowledge knowledge of the properties of a particular object, i.e. a subject of experience or self? And if so, how does it differ (if at all) from other kinds of singular knowledge?

S. Shoemaker (1968), "Self-reference and self-awareness" *Journal of Philosophy* 65: 555-67  
G. Evans, "Self-identification" in his *The Varieties of reference* (Oxford: 1982)

G. E. M. Anscombe (1975), "The first person" in Guttenplan, S. D. (ed.), *Mind and Language*, Oxford University Press: 45-65  
Excerpts from M. Johnston, *Surviving Death* (Princeton: 2011) and J. J. Valberg, *Dream, Death and the Self* (Princeton: 2007)

### **03.05 / 10.05**

#### Self-knowledge and acquaintance

Arguably, phenomenal judgments – i.e. judgments involving the self-ascription of various phenomenal properties – are among the most basic and paradigmatic examples of self-knowledge. What justifies these judgments? In particular, what are we to make of the Russellian idea of a justificatory relation of acquaintance holding between a phenomenal judgment and the very experience that that judgment is about?

B. Gertler (2012), "Renewed acquaintance" In Smithies, D. & D. Stoljar (eds.), *Introspection and Consciousness*, Oxford University Press: 89-123  
R. Fumerton (2005), "Specked hens and objects of acquaintance", *Philosophical Perspectives* 19 (1):121–138.

Excerpts from D. Chalmers (2003), "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief" in Smith, Q. & A. Jokic (eds.), *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*, Oxford University Press: 220-72

P. Livingston (2013), "Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance" *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 20 (5).

D. Papineau (2011), "Phenomenal Concepts and the Private Language Argument" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 48 (2): 175-184.

G.E.M. Anscombe, "Private Ostensive Definition" in Gormally, L. and M. Geach (eds.), *Logic, Truth, and Meaning: Writings of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Exeter: Imprint, 2015.