

## KBNS self-knowledge seminar 18/5/18

**Attending:** Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Giacomo Melis, Alisa Mandrigin, Sam Symons, Peter Sullivan, Indrek Lobus, Xintong Wei, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Paul Conlan, Crispin Wright, Giovanni Merlo.

### Brainstorming seminar.

#### 1. A priori warrants and basic experiential warrants

- **Giacomo** suggested that it seems like an equivalence can be drawn between the lack of an appearance/reality distinction in at least some parts of the self-knowledge realm maps on to the lack of brute error in the a priori case. **Crispin** commented that presumably if one assimilates intuition with perception, this does not rule out brute error. **Peter** replied that even if you think there are intellectual seemings that are misleading, our attitude toward them is not like perceptual seemings. **Giacomo** clarified that we need to be clear exactly what we mean by intuitions. **Carrie** suggested that the parallel between intuition and perception can be taken quite far by maintaining that in the case of intuition, the misleading intuition can be rectified by further reflection
- **Giovanni** wondered to what extent these concerns map on to the self-knowledge case? It seems plausible that in the case of judgements about e.g. the phenomenal character of my experiences the following situation is not possible: I am justified in forming my belief but I am wrong. **Peter** suggested that you might just observe that a certain feature holds of certain knowledge of some kinds, or you might think that a genuine link holds between the two. Insofar as you think there is a genuine link, you might think that we should be looking for some explanation which is shared by both. **Giacomo** commented that the notion of the independence of experience is useful here – at the negative level, perceptual evidence plays no role in both. **Peter** suggested that we could approach this in two phases: (1) is it true that both domains have this feature (immunity to brute error)? (2) What are the explanations of this feature?
- **Giovanni** commented that Jonathan has been sceptical of privileged access in the past, how does this proposal strike you? **Jonathan** replied that he is happy with the view that some beliefs that are typed according to their aetiology cannot be mistaken, but doesn't think that's a very interesting view. **Crispin** suggested that if we say brute error is possible, then there is a distinction between the seeming of being in pain and being in pain. The point is the question of whether there's a distinction between e.g. the seeming of the seeming and the seeming. And this doesn't seem to make sense. **Jonathan** replied that it seems that it is one thing for a thing to obtain and another for it to seem to obtain. **Giovanni** suggested that if you want to rationalise the brute error, you want there to be such a thing that the agent got right.
- **Carrie** asked whether the possibility of a regress of seemings really a vicious regress? **Giovanni** replied by asking whether this regress is really a plausible picture? Is it really plausible there are experiences of experiences and so on?

**Peter:** Sense data were supposed to capture that which is common across true and false beliefs – it is right that you need more than misleading evidence in play, but brute error is supposed to bring in that.

**Crispin:** The idea of brute error is that you have done everything right, and yet you got it wrong. Applying this to the self-knowledge case

- **Peter** suggested that once we have the structure of the position in play, then the question is whether there is anything of that kind. What kind of investigation would we undertake into this? In terms of functional roles? Or in terms of there being a functional role specified by an epistemological perspective, but this is a bad role, so why would we look for it? This is how people moved by Wittgenstein would respond, for example. **Giovanni** replied that maybe one project would be to look at whether there are indeed good grounds to think that this role cannot be filled, and another would be to examine how tightly this is linked to privileged access. This would vindicate one possible view of privileged access. **Crispin** commented that there's a jump there – I don't think privileged access on the table yet, just immunity from brute error.

## 2. Scepticism about privileged access

- **Jonathan** suggested that it might be helpful to get clear about what's going on in cases where privileged access is not present, as a way of making clear the privileged access thesis. Answering the question of how we seem to get aspects of the inner realm wrong in some cases would be good for this. Further we might also look at the intersection of buddhist philosophy and self-knowledge. Perhaps we could again invite Evan Thompson.
- **Peter** wondered whether it would be better to think of the scepticism as breaking down into the subclassifications (salience, authority, immediacy) again. **Giovanni** replied that it seems like we'd want to look at scepticism about authority and salience in particular. **Crispin** suggested that we've focussed pretty heavily on privileged access and the phenomenal, it would be good to look at the intentional.

## 3. Quasi-Luminosity