

**Attending:** Crispin Wright, Giovanni Merlo, Indrek Lobus, Giacomo Melis, Jose, Peter Sullivan, Xintong Wei, Paul Conlan, Carrie Jenkins, Jonathan Ichikawa, Alan Millar.

**Presenting:** Xintong

**Discussing:** Research presentation

- **Peter** wondered exactly how intentional the pretense in question for Gendler is.
- **Jonathan** pointed out that in this literature in general there is neutrality as to the doxastic attitude of the agent – the pretense is a non-committal representation.
- **Giovanni** asked what exactly the role of the imagination in pretense is. **Xintong** clarified that if imaginative pretense has some motivational role, then one can be motivated by imagination without performing as the pretense. **Alan** suggested that the use of pretense is somewhat misleading, but the locution ‘indulging in a fantasy’ is a clearer target for the point.
- **Indrek** wondered if you could be self-deceived with regards to ones own actions, such as taking them to be beneficent when they are not. **Xintong** suggested that this indeed is the case, and perhaps one could be deceived about the intention.
- **Giovanni** suggested that the two objections could be related in the sense that Gendler wants the pretense to play the role normally played by belief in the introspective and motivational circumstances, and it may be unclear how pretense gets to do that if it is not truth aiming. **Crispin** suggested that the second objection could be strengthened – the agent has no motive to dismiss counter-evidence to her belief unless her attitude is truth aiming.
- **Peter** suggested that perhaps self-deception is quarantined in the same way as pretense – surely self-deception is sustained precisely because it is insensitive to evidence. **Xintong** responded that the sense of quarantine that **Peter** suggests is not the one used here – rather the sense of quarantine is one of motivation – one will only play doctor with people who are pretending to be sick.
- **Jonathan** wondered where we can draw the boundaries of the pretense episode – what should Gendler’s view predict? **Giovanni** suggested that once the pretense has the same motivational role as belief, and once the scope of the pretense is one’s entire life, then the difference between pretense and belief is notational. Further, there might be a view where self-deception is a pretense taken to be a belief.
- **Peter** wondered whether the discussion of e.g. social media group echo chambers in the humanities in general is an avenue of discussion regarding social self-deception. Peter also further suggested that **Xintong’s** account brings in motivated irrationality. **Giovanni**

suggested that this account brings self-deception closer to general cases of motivated irrationality, which could be viewed as a positive.

- **Giovanni** suggested that it was not clear how the proposal suggests the self-deceiver is violating the norms of rationality – it is not that I am not responsive to the evidence that I am  $p$ , it is that there is no evidence for me that I am  $p$ .