

**Attending:** Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Sonia Roca Royes, Giovanni Merlo, Xintong Wei, Paul Conlan, Crispin Wright, Indrek Lobus, Peter Sullivan, Giacomo Melis, Alan Millar

**Presenting:** Crispin

**Topic:** Explanatory Models of Authority, Saliency and Immediacy

### On Expressivism

- **Carrie** wondered whether it is an assumption that something cannot both be an experience and be the subject of an experience. **Crispin** suggested that you can pay attention to what you feel. **Jonathan** suggested he didn't feel the force of this manner of putting the problem. **Crispin** suggested that one could objectify the experience, and then think about that, and some sort of regress looms. **Alan** clarified that 'attending to the experience' goes on at the level of thought.
- **Peter** clarified that 'intentional' means that the utterance is an intentional action.
- **Carrie** wondered how far a minimalism about the truth-conditional content can avert the felt need for a substantive epistemological story. She suggested that she has a paper which explores this issue 'What Quasi-Realists can say about Knowledge'. **Crispin** suggested you'd also need to be minimalist about truth for ordinary psychology across the board, and that might be too big a hostage to the view.
- **Giovanni** wondered what the topic of expressivism actually is – is it just a certain set of behaviour and utterances. It is difficult to see what the topic could be when one moves to 'internal avowals' for example.
- **Crispin** wondered whether we can make sense of 'giving evidence to myself' when I engage in inner speech in the same way that I give evidence when I manifest my pain in an utterance to an interlocutor.
- **Jonathan** wondered whether this isn't just the Carruthers view we looked at, where canonical evidence for belief is from inner speech. **Crispin** responded that the aim of the expressivist account is to show how we have self-knowledge, so the explanation of knowledge of inner speech cannot itself appear to self-knowledge.
- **Peter** suggested that the ambiguity in 'declaring what you are thinking' might be an intentional ambiguity. We take the utterance to be both manifesting your thought and declaring that thought.
- **Indrek** wondered whether the attractive point that 'expressivism makes your mind manifest' is unique to expressivism. **Crispin** suggested that what we want is an account of the metaphysics of mind that doesn't leave the move from one's having of a mental state to the

knowledge of that state to be a chancy metaphysical move. Also there's question of how there is a fit between what the subject says and the behaviour that manifests the state they are in. **Indrek** suggested that the manifestation of states need not be the only way that the states be known – the manifestation view might be independent of an account of self-knowledge.

### On Constitutivism

- **Giovanni** suggested that the constitutivist presupposes an account of immediacy rather than offering one to us, and this is akin to the second question on the handout. **Crispin** suggested that what we need to explain is how there can be cases which are properly immediate as their very nature, based on no grounds whatsoever (and not cases where the subject takes it that there are no grounds).
- **Giovanni** wondered what it is that brings the response dependence in to the constitutive account. **Crispin** suggested that it is deference to the fact that the speaker is in a position to know. Response-dependence is the thought that subjects are well placed to know the facts. **Indrek** wondered why there is a further question as to why the alignment holds. **Giovanni** suggested that adding a response-dependent component amounted to an answer to that question. **Crispin** suggested that there are three positions – the biconditional holds for one of these reasons: Socratic (subjects are very good at telling their mental states), interpretivist and response dependent.
- **Giovanni** wondered why the constitutivist raises the questions they do (e.g. q3) at the level of concepts. **Crispin** suggested that if we put the question at the lower level, we're locked into some sort of detectivist position.
- **Sonia** wondered what happens in the case of mental states which are partially individuated by external factors. How would the truth of the constitutive biconditional be affected. **Crispin** suggested a story must be told in the c-conditions.